¿Qué pasó con "sufragio efectivo y no reelección"?

Escribí mis pensamientos respecto a la reelección política en la revista Carta Económica, publicada por la Corporación de Estudios para el Desarrollo (CORDES) en Quito en agosto de 2013 y luego en inglés para el blog Panoramas de la Universidad de Pittsburgh. Sin embargo, dados los recientes desarrollos en la región, hasta The Economist se está preguntando cuán estrictos deben ser los límites de reelección, y por eso quisiera revisitar el tema.

¿La razón? Hace un mes, en Ecuador, Alianza PAIS formalmente anunció una enmienda constitucional para permitir la reelección indefinida para todas las autoridades públicas y profundizar la consolidación del poder de su Presidente, mientras en Colombia, el Presidente Santos anunció una propuesta para eliminar la reelección presidencial inmediata. Además, entre el 2013 y la actualidad, la Cámara de Diputados boliviana aprobó una tercera elección del Presidente Evo Morales, y la Asamblea nicaragüense aprobó una reforma constitucional que garantiza la permanencia en el poder del mandatario.  ¡No no no no! Esta fiebre re eleccionista es desafortunada; es dañina tanto para el pluralismo político como para las instituciones democráticas de los países afectados.
 
La reelección presidencial ofrece las ventajas señaladas por Morales, Ortega y Correa (y el vanguardista re eleccionista en la región, Hugo Chávez): incentivos para el cumplimiento de las promesas electorales; la posibilidad de mantener políticos populares; y el alargamiento del horizonte de tiempo para la implementación de políticas.  Pero el continuismo también fomenta o facilita el abuso de poder, el personalismo y el debilitamiento de las instituciones democráticas. Cuanta mayor concentración de poder, mayor riesgo para la democracia y el pluralismo por la perduración de ese poder. La re elección indefinida es aún más peligrosa en los sistemas políticos híper presidenciales de América Latina, donde fuertes líderes poseen las herramientas para agudizar la concentración de poder y elevar sus preferencias personales por encima de las instituciones del Estado.

La solución es fácil.  Para el fortalecimiento democrático, la mejor estrategia es simplemente el statu quo de la reelección limitada. Y si ya estamos soñando, sería beneficioso para la democracia una reducción en los poderes y atributos constitucionales presidenciales en muchos de los países de América Latina.

Historia y Hechos de la Re Elección Presidencial
Desde el establecimiento del presidencialismo en los Estados Unidos, ha habido un vigoroso debate sobre la reelección. Como reacción a la tiranía de la monarquía inglesa, varios "fundadores de la nación" estadounidenses abogaron por una norma informal para regular el ejercicio de la presidencia a máximo dos términos. Esta propuesta, sin embargo, fue criticada por Alexander Hamilton en Federalista 72 (1945 [1788]), en el cual defendió la reelección presidencial indefinida como un mecanismo de rendición de cuentas del ejecutivo y, si aplicara, de prolongación de la utilidad de sus talentos y virtudes. Aunque no se proscribió la reelección en la Constitución, prevaleció la norma de facto de una sola reelección, primero a raíz de la renuncia voluntaria de George Washington después de su segundo término, y luego a través de la ratificación de la 22ª enmienda en 1951.  

En América Latina, la reelección presidencial inmediata ha sido observada tradicionalmente con desconfianza. Por la mayor parte de su historia, la no reelección inmediata ha sido considerada como un instrumento necesario para limitar el poder y, de esta manera, impedir la aparición de dictaduras. La Revolución mexicana, por ejemplo, se inició bajo la consigna de "sufragio efectivo y no reelección" de Francisco Madero después de la sexta reelección del general Porfirio Díaz, quien se mantuvo ininterrumpidamente en el poder entre 1884 y 1911. Para algunos en la época contemporánea, la permanencia de presidentes recuerda el continuismo de Stroessner, los Somoza o Balaguer, y representa el abuso del poder y la personalización de la rama ejecutiva. Asimismo, no se permitió la reelección de forma continua del presidente en ningún país latinoamericano tras la Tercera Ola de Democratización (Carey 2003; Jaramillo 2005; Serrafero 2011).

Sin embargo, esta tendencia no duró. Desde la Constitución promulgada por Alberto Fujimori en 1993, presidentes tanto de derecha como de izquierda han acudido al éxito de su proyecto político y a su propia popularidad para buscar la reelección. Como consecuencia, se ha extendido la posibilidad de alguna forma de reelección—consecutiva o no—en casi todos los países latinoamericanos salvo Guatemala, Honduras, México y Paraguay (Zovatto 2013).  Como se ve en el Cuadro 1, existe alguna de las distintas modalidades de continuidad en las otras 14 democracias: dos términos continuos en Perú (1993), Argentina (1994), Brasil (1997), Colombia (2005), Ecuador (2008), Bolivia (2009), la reelección indefinida en Venezuela (2009) y Nicaragua (2014), y la elegibilidad después de por lo menos un período interino en Uruguay, Chile, El Salvador, Panamá, República Dominicana y Costa Rica.

¡La Re Elección Limitada!
Las defensas de la re elección ilimitada son varias, pero también son débiles ante los enormes riesgos de la permanencia presidencial.

Como señaló Hamilton—y sucesivas generaciones de politólogos—la posibilidad de la reelección crea incentivos para que los legisladores cumplan con sus promesas electorales.  Bajo esta lógica, los políticos tienen incentivos para cumplir con sus promesas electorales con el fin de mantenerse en el poder. Sin embargo, la reelección presidencial es teórica y empíricamente distinta a la reelección a otros cargos (Carey 2003).  El presidente ecuatoriano o venezolano, por ejemplo, tienen mucha mayor capacidad para moldear su propio contexto político y las instituciones del Estado a través de sus poderes constitucionales que cualquier otro funcionario. Así, la reelección indefinida posee menor riesgo de abusos de poder para los asambleístas y los alcaldes, pero un mayor riesgo para el presidente.

Segundo, la reelección puede permitir una libertad para los votantes con respecto a sus opciones políticas. En teoría, una regla permisiva no elimina a ningún candidato de la boleta electoral, y por lo tanto, le ofrece al votante un menú completo de opciones. Así, eliminar restricciones sobre candidaturas puede representar la "voluntad popular" y permitir un grado de discreción para retener presidentes populares. No obstante, esta explicación es relativamente débil, debido a que al colocar al titular en la boleta electoral, otro candidato no se puede presentar. En la práctica, también es posible abusar de la acumulación de poder para cerrar espacios de oposición tanto de otros partidos como dentro del propio.

Esta es una preocupación real en el ámbito presidencial del Ecuador actual. ¿Quién es el sucesor de Correa? La oposición política tiene un apoyo de menos de 50% de la población, y está fragmentada. Los "candidatos de siempre", Lucio Gutiérrez y Álvaro Noboa, simplemente no tienen fuerte apoyo nacional (más allá de sus reconocidas debilidades como candidatos y políticos)--y tal vez ni siquiera partidos políticos. Tampoco hay posibilidades sobresalientes dentro del correismo, un movimiento sin suficiente trayectoria para producir competencia real.

Tercero, la permanencia de un presidente en sistemas políticos pocos institucionalizados puede imponer una estabilidad y continuidad de políticas que estaría ausente con el cambio frecuente de presidentes. Esta es una idea menos explorada por los académicos, pero sobresaliente en la práctica. Una baja institucionalización suele producir mayores niveles de inestabilidad, limitando la consistencia de las políticas. Además, el cambio de gobiernos suele producir mayor rotación burocrática en contextos de burocracias no weberianas que cuentan más con nombramientos políticos que con burócratas de carrera para implementar políticas. Pero, ¿Cuál sería el Ecuador hoy en día si León Febres Cordero u otro ex presidente hubiesen tenido la posibilidad de la reelección indefinida? ¿Qué habría sido la reacción de aquellos que hoy en día apoyan una eliminación de restricciones? Los cambios constitucionales tienen que ser deliberados, con un ojo en las repercusiones a largo plazo, y no a raíz de la coyuntura. Así se construyen las instituciones democráticas y la verdadera estabilidad.

El contraste de Ecuador con su país vecino de Ecuador es chocante.  En el 2010, el ex Presidente Álvaro Uribe respetó la decisión de la Corte Constitucional Colombiana que prohibía una tercera re elección presidencial--algo que requirió tanto una corte autónoma e independiente como un político dispuesto a aceptar el juicio. Ahora, la propuesta de Juan Manuel Santos de eliminar la figura de la re elección presidencial amplifica la diferencia con el Ecuador (y Venezuela y Nicaragua y Bolivia…).

La continuada reelección de un presidente puede conllevar algunas ventajas, pero la permanencia atrinchera el statu quo y erosiona la institucionalización a favor del personalismo. Además, desde una perspectiva normativa, el continuismo requerido para inducir la construcción e implementación de políticas de largo plazo no debe originarse en los individuos sino en las instituciones. La mejor solución es imponer límites a la re elección, logrando una continuidad política y una rendición de cuentas junto con la renovación política, el sine qua non de la democracia.

Nota
Una versión de este blog fue publicado por Carta Económica:
     Polga-Hecimovich, John. 2013. "La (re-)reelección y el poder presidencial". Carta Económica, 19(8): 2-4
Otra versión está disponible en inglés en Panoramas de la Universidad de Pittsburgh:     "Old Faces in the Same Places", http://www.panoramas.pitt.edu/content/old-faces-same-places-1

Referencias
Carey, John M. 2003. "The Reelection Debate in Latin America." Latin American Politics and Society 45    
     (1):119-33.
Hamilton, Alexander, James Madison, and John Jay. 1945 [1788]. The Federalist; or, The New Constitution. 
     New York: The Heritage Press.
Jaramillo, Juan Fernando. 2005. "La reelección presidencial inmediata en Colombia." Nueva Sociedad 198:15-
     31.
Navia, Patricio. 2009. "Limit the Power of Presidents, Not their Term in Office." Americas Quarterly Spring 
     2009.
Serrafero, Mario D. 2011. "La reelección presidencial indefinida en América Latina." Revista de Instituciones, 
     Ideas y Mercados 54:225-59.
Zovatto, Daniel. 2013. "América Latina padece de una fiebre reeleccionista." Estrategia & Negocios, 42-6.

The mood was somber in my house on Tuesday night and on Wednesday, after hearing of the death of Hugo Chávez.  The president had not appeared in public since early December 2012, was fighting cancer and a mysterious respiratory infection, and had lost the ability to speak, yet Venezuelans I know seemed to assume that he would return.  His passing even shocked silent the Chigüire Bipolar for a day.  In human terms, it was difficult to assimilate the passing of a figure who cast such a large shadow over contemporary Venezuela and who directly or indirectly affected the lives of so many current and future Venezuelans (amazingly, my Venezuelan wife had never voted in a presidential election without him on the ballot).  Indeed, for someone who led his country with such conviction and outsized gusto and rhetoric, the circumstances of the comandante’s death were much more eliot (as in t.s.) than Sid Vicious.

Assessing Chávez’s legacy will be the work of generations of social scientists and historians.  His tangible legacy is much clearer than the intangible one (as, I suppose, is often the case with all tangibles and intangibles): he leaves an economy in shambles, a bloated and inefficient public bureaucracy, an enormous public debt, and dated infrastructure.  Corruption is rampant.  Homicide rates are at record highs, and political institutions are weak or non-existent.  Despite enjoying record high oil prices over the past dozen years, the country suffers from food shortages on such basic items as meat, sugar, milk, and Harina P.A.N., the corn flour for every Venezuelans' daily arepa.  At the official exchange rate, Harina P.A.N. imported from Colombia is cheaper in Washington, D.C. than it is in Caracas.  And when my wife and I were married in the Andean state of Táchira in 2011, we arranged for family and friends to arrive via Colombia rather than Venezuela because official exchange rates in Venezuela made the cost prohibitively expensive.

Of course, I probably have Chávez and his friends to thank for my marriage in the first place: Rebeca signed the 2003 petition for the 2004 presidential recall referendum, and her name was subsequently published on the lista Tascón.  As with innumerable other Venezuelans, this leaked signature limited the possibility of public sector employment, and she chose instead to seek a Master’s Degree in Ecuador, where I met her.  Later, she came to the U.S., where work was more forthcoming.  More shockingly, she is one of nine public high school classmates (of 37) who have escaped political or economic conditions in Venezuela to work abroad.  I have no doubt that Chávez and his Bolivarian Revolution genuinely hoped to sew economic development and social equality while giving voice to the poor.  But the lista Tascón incident is representative of a broader pattern of intimidation and politicization of public life that marked Chávez’s tenure—especially after 2002.

It is difficult to discuss Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution without taking sides.  The president’s rhetoric was often inflammatory and polarizing, with accusations and conspiratorial plots hurled against enemies, real or perceived.  Chávez cultivated enemies like Bush and Uribe, and friends like Putin, Lukashenko, and Ahmadinejad, and his international and domestic role was often that of a dangerous provocateur.  It is his leadership (and oil money) that permitted the creation of ALBA and UNASUR.  He was, if nothing, consistent across domestic and international in his political intransigence.   Of course, this stubbornness was fueled by the often disorganized and uninspired opposition forces, which consistently underestimated the breadth and width of Chávez’s support and foolishly perpetrated a coup d’état with the silent consent of a pliant U.S. in 2002.  Any trace of compromise from the government disappeared with this enormous blunder.

H.L. Mencken famously wrote that a demagogue is one who preaches doctrines he knows to be untrue to men he knows to be idiots.  As popular elections proved over and over again, Chávez was only a demagogue in the eyes of 40% of Venezuelans; he was a patron and hero to the rest.  In January I visited Western Caracas, around the area of Pérez Bonalde and near the neighborhood 23 de enero (where a rally lead by the Communal Council and a PSUV deputy commemorating the fall of dictator Marcos Pérez Jiménez famously armed young children with Kalashnikovs while flanked by graffiti of an armed Jesus).  Leaving the metro, there was a National Electoral Council booth in the station for people to register to vote.  Up the stairs, in the light of day, I encountered people scurrying in and out of a Misión Alimentación office with food, a line for free eye exams as a part of Misión Milagro, and hand-written signs for people to enroll to improve their literacy in Misión Robinson.   Like so many ringing it, this neighborhood with unfinished buildings and even unpaved roads was being offered basic government services at little or no cost.  The political recognition and electoral mobilization of these sectors means that Venezuelan leaders can no longer ignore the poor.  In fact, social programs targeted at alleviating poverty have become standard fare for opposition leaders, a much-welcomed addition to party platforms.

Still, Chávez leaves behind a bitterly divided, polarized country.  He preached a politics of exclusion, especially after the failed coup of 2002 and with greater gusto after the PDVSA strike of 2002-2003.  Under his rule, a violent society grew from bad to worse.  According to UNODC Homicide Statistics, Venezuela had the fifth-highest homicide rate in the world in 2010, unmatched by middle-income countries.  Sadly, many Venezuelans are numbed to the carjackings, murders, and secuestros express that take place around them.  Playing dominos with my brother-in-law and his friends one night, they regaled me their or their families’ experiences of robberies and kidnappings; I was the only one of the bunch without a story.  Another high school classmate of Rebeca’s was murdered at an ATM in her hometown, the victim of a robbery.  Chávez himself proclaimed to be the center of innumerable assassination attempts, and wore bulletproof clothing constantly, including bulletproof liqui liquis.  Perhaps this violence and fear of violent death makes Chávez’s passing at the hand of the insidious but too common cancer even more startling.

What happens now?  Well, following the trail blazed by Chávez himself, the government has decided to ignore article 233 of the 1999 Constitution and appoint Vice-President Nicolás Maduro as President instead of Assembly President Diosdado Cabello.  There will be elections—maybe in thirty days, maybe more—, and Maduro will win, bolstered by sympathy for Chávez and the promise of continuing his revolution.  Unfortunately for Maduro, he will be stuck with cleaning up the mess created by Chávez, the violence, the economic situation, the crumbling infrastructure, without the benefit of Chávez’s charisma, force of personality or iron control over those around him.  Things will not change much in the short-term, little-lone overnight.  The same people are in power, the lack of institutionality endures, and still 50% of the population supports the PSUV.  Chavismo may live on, but it will not remain in power indefinitely.  Henrique Capriles’ time will come.

Chávez long expressed that he wanted to be buried in Sabaneta, his family’s hometown in the llano.  Forty-eight hours after his official death, while millions mourned his absence, Interim President and successor Maduro has announced instead that the ex-President would be embalmed and displayed "so that the whole world can contemplate it like Ho-Chi Ming, Lenin, and Mao Tse Tung".  Chávez would have little right to complain; it is he who handpicked Maduro, Cabello, Elías Jaua, et al., and it is he who is ultimately responsible for creating his own myth.  Rather than resting in linda Barinas, tierra llanera, Chávez will no doubt transcend the economic and political turmoil he leaves behind as a symbol for anti-imperialism and the poor.  Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for the majority of Venezuelans.

JPH

Rafael Correa begins March 2013 as the longest-lasting president in Ecuadorian history, with a little over six years in power.[1]  His victory in the February 17, 2013, national elections guarantees him at least four more years, and opens the possibility of constitutional changes to permit permanent re-election.  The president not only won re-election with a resounding 57% of the valid vote, but he defeated his nearest challenger, banker Guillermo Lasso, by a 35-point margin.  Furthermore, Correa’s Alianza Patria Altiva I Soberana (Alianza PAIS) party obtained the first legislative majority since the country’s return to democracy in 1979 with 92 of the 137 seats in the unicamerical National Assembly.

Correa’s continuity and success is not an accident, but a byproduct of good fortune, targeted social policies and increased social expenditures, and a weak opposition. However, despite these electoral victories and unprecedented presidential stability, the short-term successes of the administration’s policies presage mixed long-term prospects for the Ecuadorian economy and democratic institutions.

The Economy, Social Spending, and Poverty
Correa’s overwhelming support in the election can be credited to a number of factors, including increased government reserves due to strong oil prices and increased tax revenues; an increase in social spending and increased access to health-care; and a growing economy and improved infrastructure.  The GDP has grown steadily since 2007, with a 5.2% increase in 2012 (Figure 1, chart 2). Further, the majority of this growth was outside the hydrocarbon sector, especially construction and aquaculture.  Crucially, this growth has not produced inflation.  The country closed 2012 with an annual inflation rate of 4.16% (Figure 1, chart 1), within the healthy range established by the Central Bank.

The central government has benefitted during this time from high oil prices, which have remained around $80 a barrel during Correa’s tenure (Figure 1, chart 3).  Although petroleum production represents only 12-13% of GDP (Figure 1, chart 1), earnings from the oil sector account for half of the government’s revenue (INEC 2013).  However, this revenue collection is not sufficient to cover the doubling of social spending in the country.  Part of this difference is being covered by improvements in the internal revenue service (Servicio de Rentas Internas, SRI), which has increased its coverage and effectiveness of tax collection in the country.  Discounting seasonality, collected tax revenue has doubled from around US$400 million to US$900 million monthly, as shown by the sustained increase of the tax take in Figure 1, chart 4 ("Yasuní and the future of Ecuadorean oil"  2013).

Notwithstanding the high oil prices and improved tax collection, the fiscal deficit has grown to nearly US$4 billion annually under Correa.  To cover these expenditures, the government has signed oil-for-cash agreements with China for nearly US$9 billion at terms worse than those proposed by the demonized International Monetary Fund ("Counting on Chinese credit"  2012).  It is precisely this type of deal that augers poorly for the sustainability of the social programs—or the country’s external debt.  Finite oil reserves and high interest rates on Chinese loans are even less advantageous to Ecuador than previous loans from foreign lenders that were bemoaned from the government; the country loudly escaped one type of dependency when it defaulted on its foreign debt in 2008, but it has now apparently traded that for a similar dependency on China.

Figure 1. Economic Indicators

Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos (INEC) and the Ecuadorian Central Bank

The annual budget has doubled since the start of the Correa administration, increasing from 11 billion dollars in 2006 to over 26 billion dollars in 2012 (INEC 2013).  The government has invested heavily in infrastructure and education, and has provided cash-handouts to poor families through the Human Development Bond (BDH).  Under this program, poor families with children up to the age of 16 receive a monthly stipend of US$50, accounting for some 1.6 million people (Bono de Desarrollo Humano y Pensiones  2012).[2]  The results have been positive.  According to the Central Bank, since taking office in 2006, poverty has dropped 10 full percentage points, from 37.6 per cent in December 2006 to 35.09 per cent in December 2008 to 27.3 per cent in December 2012 (Figure 2, chart 1).[3]  Inequality has also dropped, as shown in Figure 2, chart 2, from a Gini coefficient of 0.54 to 0.48.  Lastly, unemployment has also experienced similar reductions, dropping from 9.03 per cent in January 2007 to 7.31 per cent in December 2008 to 5.04 per cent in December 2012 (Figure 2, chart 3), although this does not factor in underemployment that is common throughout the country.

Figure 2. Socio-economic indicators

Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos (INEC) and the Ecuadorian Central Bank

Democracy
Offsetting many of these socio-economic gains, Correa has faced significant criticism for undercutting democratic institutions and directly challenging freedom of press.  Correa pursued libel charges against three directors and a journalist of the Guayaquil daily El Universo after publishing an opinion piece on the policy mutiny that was critical of the president.  The three directors were fined US$40 million, and all four were assessed three-years in prison.  Correa pursued similar charges against two journalists who wrote a book critical of business negotiations between the president’s brother, Fabricio Correa, and the government.  After months of negative international and domestic attention, including criticism from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, President Correa announced in February 2012 that he would drop all charges ("Media battle is part of wider war"  2012; "Meting out punishment"  2012).

Somewhat ironically, Correa granted political asylum to WikiLeaks founder, Julian Assange, on August 16, 2012 ("Ecuador gambles on WikiLeaks founder Assange"  2012; "Ricardo Patiño anuncia que Ecuador concede el asilo a Julian Assange"  2012).  The administration publically claimed that this was a principled decision to protect freedom of speech, although it is consistent with an antagonistic foreign policy that is publicly critical of the U.S. and international financial institutions.  The administration has also garnered criticism for cultivating diplomatic links with authoritarian regimes, and hosted visits by Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the Syrian Vice Chancellor.  Correa also offered asylum to Syrian president Bashar al-Assad in an interview with the Brazilian daily Folha de São Paulo in October 2012 (Marreiro 2012).

In 2012, judicial reforms have garnered the most attention for undercutting democratic institutions. In the interest of eliminating judicial corruption, the Correa administration proposed a 3-person committee that would have full authority over a period of 18 months to reform the National Court of Justice. This 3-peson committee replaces the Transitional Judicial Council with the same responsibility as determined by the 2008 Constitution.  Critics suggest that the 3-person committee will be populated by loyalists to Correa and his party and that it unconstitutionally replaces a pre-existing institution. This and nine other proposals passed by popular referendum on 7 May 2011. [4]

The Future
Correa and Alianza PAIS’s success in the 2013 elections is an indicator of the president’s widespread popular approval and lack of popular investment in or regard for matters of horizontal accountability or balance-of-powers.  Ultimately, for the majority of Ecuadorian voters, economic voting took precedence over the more abstract matter of democratic accountability (Lewis-Beck 1988; Powell and Whitten 1993).  The increase in social spending, education, and health care are the most relevant yardsticks of government performance for most of the population.  However, the deficit of democratic institutions and increasing monetary and petroleum obligations to China will inevitably catch up to Ecuador.

Further, there is no political force on the horizon that appears capable of restricting the president’s power or offering a legitimate counterpoint to Alianza PAIS.  Much like Venezuela in its first decade under Hugó Chávez, the fragmented and debilitated opposition forces have not managed to unite around a common proposal, ideology or political strategy.  Until they coalesce around a common front, President Correa will continue to mold the Ecuadorian state as he wants, with certain socioeconomic and infrastructure gains, but at the cost of political pluralism and dialogue, and institutional independence.

This spells institutional change for Ecuador, with a deepening of the president’s Citizen’s Revolution and an increase in the concentration of state power in the executive.  The real prize for Correa in all of this is his supermajority in the assembly, which allows him a range of legislative possibilities in the 2013-2017 period.  For example, although the president publicly denied the possibility of changing the constitution to permit indefinite president re-election—a measure taken by ideological allies Chávez and Daniel Ortega—it would be unwise to discard this possibility.  In an interview regarding this topic after the elections, Correa responded by threatening that, “if these mediocre members of the partyocracy and press keep bothering me, I’ll run for re-election so these sufferers suffer” ("Rafael Correa: 'si siguen molestando me lanzo a la reelección'"  2013).[5]  By then, it will be clearer if the short-term economic gains are indeed sustainable in the long-run.



[1] This surpasses Isidro Ayora who ruled as dictator for five years (1926-1931).

[2] The value of the bond was previously US$35, but political one-upmanship drove it to US$50.  Speaking in the coastal city of Portoviejo in September 2012, presidential candidate Guillermo Lasso suggested proposed eliminating the government department of propaganda and using the recovered finances to fund this increase in the BDH (Pilco 2012). Not to be outdone, Correa responded by cutting out Lasso’s figurative feet from under him, proposing an identical increase and, as an added twist, financing the raise through further taxes on the banking sector.  This raise took effect through Presidential Decree 8/2013, issued on January 2, 2013.

[3] Poverty is considered to include those who live below US$2.54 a day.

[4] In November 2012, Correa also appointed his ex-personal secretary, Gustavo Jalkh, as the new president of the Consejo de la Judicatura (Judiciary Council), the state organ charged with assigning judges across the country.

[5] Textually, Correa said: “si siguen molestando estos mediocres de la partidocracia y de los medios de comunicación me les lanzo a la reeleción, para que sufran los sufridores”.


References
Bono de Desarrollo Humano y Pensiones. 2013. (10 diciembre 2012). Trámites Ecuador 2012 [cited 28 febrero 2013 2013]. Available from http://tramitesecuador.com/ministerio-de-inclusion-economica-y-social-mies/bono-de-desarrollo-humano/.

"Counting on Chinese credit." 2012. Latin American Regional Report (LARR), Febrero 2012, 12.

"Ecuador gambles on WikiLeaks founder Assange." 2012. Washington Post, 20/08/2012.

INEC. P.I.B. Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censo (INEC) 2013 [cited 28 febrero 2013. Available from http://www.ecuadorencifras.com/cifras-inec/pib.html#tpi=371.

Lewis-Beck, Michael S. 1988. Economics and Elections: The Major Western Democracies. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Marreiro, Flávia. 2012. "Equador avaliará eventual pedido de asilo de governo Assad, diz Rafael Correa." Folha de São Paulo, 10/12/2012.

"Media battle is part of wider war." 2012. Latin American Regional Report (LARR), Febrero 2012, 10-1.

"Meting out punishment." 2012. Latin American Regional Report (LARR), Abril 2012, 7.

Pilco, Carolina. 2012. "Guillermo Lasso ofreció aumentar el bono a USD 50." El Comercio, 29/09/2012.

Powell, G. Bingham, Jr., and Guy D. Whitten. 1993. "A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context." American Journal of Political Science 37 (2):391-414.

"Rafael Correa: 'si siguen molestando me lanzo a la reelección'." 2013. La Hora, 23 febrero 2013.

"Ricardo Patiño anuncia que Ecuador concede el asilo a Julian Assange." 2012. El Comercio, 16/08/2012.

"Yasuní and the future of Ecuadorean oil." 2013. Latin American Weekly Report (LAWR), 31 enero 2013, 5.